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Abstract 
In digital signature schemes a user is allowed to sign a document by using a public key 
infrastructure (PKI). For signing a document, the sender encrypts the hash of the document by 
                                                                                   received 
signature and to check if it matches the document hash. Generally a digital signature scheme 
                                                                 the signature can be 
checked later. But under some situations a group of signers is required to sign a message 
cooperatively, so that a single verifier or a group of verifiers can check the validity of the given 
signature. This scheme is known as a multisignature. A multisignature scheme is one of the 
tools in which plural entities can sign a document more efficiently than they realize it by 
trivially constructing single signatures. In general, in a multisignature scheme, the total 
signature size and the verification cost are smaller than those in the trivially constructed 
scheme. Thus, plural signers can collectively and efficiently sign an identical message. There 
are different base primitives describing the type of numerical problems upon which the 
underlying security scheme is based on. In this thesis, some of the most important DLP based 
multisignature schemes are presented. A categorization between these different existing 
schemes has been shown, along with their pros and cons. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Being a part of the information age, we need to keep tabs on a variety of aspects of our 
life. With inflating volume of information, its value increases in manifolds day by day. 
Since the Internet serves as the quintessential mode of communication and a tool of 
commerce for tens of millions of people, security becomes a tremendously important 
issue to deal with. To be secured, information needs to fulfill three primary security 
goals named confidentiality – To be hidden from unauthorized accessed, integrity– To 
be protected from unauthorized changes and availability- To be available to an 
authorized entity when it is needed [1]. In order to ensure that the primary security 
goals are satisfied there are several security services and mechanisms to implement 
those services. In general security serves a variety of purposes, ranging from secure 
commerce and payments to private communications and protecting passwords. 
Cryptography is one such aspect of secure communication. 
1.1 The Purpose of Cryptography 
 
Cryptography, an ancient art, can be considered as the science of writing in secret code. 
Following the widespread development of computer communications new forms of 
cryptography came into existence. In case of data and telecommunications, 
cryptography is indispensable when communicating over any insecure medium, which 
includes pretty nearly any network, predominantly the Internet.  Cryptography not only 
protects data from malice or modification, but also used for user authentication. The 
cryptographic schemes can be categorized into 3 categories to accomplish these goals: 
secret key cryptography, public-key cryptography, and hash functions [2]. 
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1.2 Secret Key Cryptography 
In secret or symmetric key cryptography the sender encrypts the message and sends it 
by a key say k. The receiver decrypts the message after receiving the message by using 
the same key k. The assumption is based upon the fact that here, both the sender and 
receiver use a common key and the transmission of the message and the key of cipher 
text is done in an insecure channel. This system is vulnerable and flawed if the key k is 
leaked and it is known to the adversary. 
1.3 Public Key Cryptography 
 
To overcome the problems of the symmetric key cryptography or the common key 
cryptography public key cryptosystem or public key encipherment is used. This scheme 
is similar to that of symmetric key cryptosystem, including few exceptions. Actually 
two keys are used instead of one, one public key and one private key. Before sending 
the message the sender encrypts it with the public key of the receiver. The receiver 
decrypts the message by using his own private key. 
1.4 Digital Signature 
 
A digital signature verifies the authenticity of an electronic document or digital 
message. The common use of digital signatures is to identify electronic entities for 
online transactions. A user is convinced to believe that the message was created by a 
known legitimate sender, such that later the sender cannot deny the fact that he had sent 
the message and that the message was not altered during transmission [3]. A digital 
                                                                               ensures 
the integrity of the signed data against tampering or corruption. Digital signatures are 
commonly used for the software distribution, authenticate online entity, and verify the 
origin of digital data. It also                                              tampering, 
financial transactions, and in other case where it is important to detect forgery attack. In 
Figure 1.1 an entire digital signature procedure is shown [39]. 
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Figure 1.1: Digital signature procedure  
 
1.4.1 Authentication 
A message source is authenticated by digital signature. By the validation of the 
signature it is confirmed that the message was sent by that user, where user being the 
requester. Authenticity in digital signature means that the message or the user is valid 
[4,5]. 
 1.4.2 Non-repudiation 
 
Non-repudiation is a vital feature of digital signature. By virtue of this property, a 
signer simply cannot deny at a later point of time that he had not signed that [4, 5]. 
1.4.3 Integrity 
 
The integrity of the message can be maintained even if we sign the whole message 
because the same signature cannot be obtained if the existing message is changed. With 
the help of hash functions, signing and verifying is done in case of digital signature so 
that the integrity of the message can be preserved [4, 5]. 
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1.4.4 Attacks on Digital Signature 
 
This section describes attack on digital signature. Key-Only                     
attack and Chosen-               are some attacks on DS. If the attack is successful, 
the result is a forgery. We can have two types of forgery [6, 7]. In a cryptographic 
digital signature system, digital signature forgery is the ability to create a pair 
consisting of a message and a signature that is valid for message, and message has not 
been signed by the legitimate signer [8]. Existential and Selective are the two types of 
forgery. 
 Existential Forgery 
 
In an existential forgery                      to create         signature-message 
pair, but the attacker cannot use this pair really. This type of forgery is probable, but the 
attacker cannot benefit from it [8]. 
 Selective Forgery 
 
In the selective forgery, the attacker is able to forge signers signature on a message. 
The attacker gets benefit from this forge unlike existential forgery. The probability of 
such forge is low [8]. 
1.5 Multisignature 
 
                                                                         signers 
                                                                   A trifling 
solution says                   should sign                                     
scheme respectively. Clearly in this simple solution the security requirement of the 
multisignature scheme depends on the security of underlying signature schemes. It 
                                                                              
                       linearly as the number of signers grow               Two 
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additional properties, submitted by Harn are to be satisfied in order to achieve an 
optimal multisignature scheme [9]:  
1)                                                                                     
2)                                                                                  
an individual signature. 
Therefore, in an ideal                                              as well as 
the computation costs for verification should be                              signers 
participating in signing. A multisignature procedure is shown in Figure 1.2 
 
Fig 1.2: Multisignature procedure 
 
1.6 Evolution of Different Multisignature Schemes 
                                                                          
                                                                           
product of three primes rather than just two [10]. Since then various other 
multisignature schemes have been proposed based on different base primitives. Base 
primitive denotes the  kinds of numerical problems on which the security of the 
multisignature schemes depends. Generally base primitives include IFP, DLP and 
ECDLP. 
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After that many multisignature schemes had been proposed in [11-16] but the 
first multisignature, based on DLP was proposed by Harn in 1994 [17]. As here we 
focus only on schemes based upon DLP we will discuss [11-13] and many more under 
different categories.  
1.7 Types of Multisignature 
 
Generally digital multisignature schemes can be classified into two classes depending 
on the authority of the signers. 
1)                                                          
2)                                                        
For the first class of                                      present in the 
signing group bear                                      entire message where as in the 
second class of multisignature scheme every member gets his own distinguished 
signing authority [11]. 
All the digital signature schemes can be further classified into two classes 
depending on the process of verification. 
1) Multisignatures for specified group of verifiers. 
2) Multisignatures for any verifier(s). 
                                                                                 
group of verifiers, and the validity of the multisignature can be checked only by all the 
verifiers in that specified group together, but in second case any number of verifier can 
validate the signature for the message [12]. 
1.8 Signature Structure  
                                                                                     
structured. The signing order of the entities plays a vital role. Actually it signifies a 
special meaning when signers sign a document sequentially. Such a signature structure 
is called serial. Alternatively, if partial signatures are created by all or part of the 
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signers in an arbitrary order and combined to create a complete signature, the signing 
order of the signers has no meaning. Such a signature structure is called parallel [13]. 
1.9 Organization of Thesis 
                 of the                     : Chapter 2 discusses some mathematical 
preliminaries; In Chapter 3 the multisignature schemes for distinguished signing 
authorities has been discussed. Chapter 4 describes structured multisignature schemes. 
Chapter 5 includes description of multisignature schemes foe specified group of 
verifiers. Finally, we conclude with Chapter 6 by giving few observations. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Mathematical Preliminaries 
 
Following basic notations, definitions and models are used throughout this thesis. 
2.1 Notation and Terminology 
All groups discussed in this thesis are assumed to be abelian. Groups of prime order 
have useful properties and are widely used in cryptography. All groups of prime order 
are cyclic.  
A group   is said to be cyclic if there is an element      , such that for each 
      , there is an integer   with      . Such an element is called a generator of   
[18]. For any prime integer  , the field of integers modulo   is denoted by   . The 
cyclic multiplicative group of nonzero elements in    is denoted as    . 
2.2 Discrete Logarithmic Problem (DLP) 
 
                                                                                    
                                                                                  
solution for the equation      over the real or complex numbers. Likewise, if   and 
  are                                                                                   
discrete logarithm to the base   of   in the group  . Briefly, if   is a finite group, the 
problem discrete logarithm in   is the following computational problem: given 
elements   and   in  , determine an integer   such that,     , provided that such an 
integer exists [8]. 
2.3 Computational Diffie-Hellman problem 
The Diffie-Hellman problem can be described as follows. Let G be a cyclic group of 
order q. If   is a generator of some group, preferably the multiplicative group of a finite 
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field, and     are randomly chosen integers then CDH assumption states that, 
given          for any randomly choosen generator g and               it is 
computationally infeasible to compute the value of [19]. 
 2.4 The Integer Factorization Problem 
 
There are many fast algorithms for multiplying two given large prime numbers. On 
the other hand, it is considerably difficult to find the prime factors if the product of 
two large primes is given. The perceptible difficulty of factoring large integers forms 
the foundation of some modern cryptographic algorithms. Many schemes rely on the 
                                                                                    
                                                                            
factorization of large primes is possible, these algorithms would not be secure 
anymore. 
2.5 Safe Primes 
 
Their relationship with the strong primes is what makes them safe prime. By definition 
a prime   is said to be a strong prime if     and     both have large prime factors. 
For a safe prime,       , the integer   is a large prime factor. The importance of 
safe primes is realized when they are used                      -based techniques like 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange If        is a                              subgroup 
of numbers modulo.        has                                . Safe primes are 
used to minimize the modulus [22]. 
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Chapter 3 
Multisignature Scheme with 
Distinguished Signing Authorities 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In general, all the constituent members of the group in a multisignature scheme are 
endowed with the same signing rights for the entire document, but under certain 
situations each member needs to have his own distinguished signing authority. As an 
example, say a governing authority receives the annual performance report about an 
organization. It is the partial contents from different departments upon which the report 
is based on.                              makes each department                  
partial contents.                            explore                         contents 
selectively because of the abject requirement of confidentiality. Simultaneously, the 
validation of the relationship between an entire report and its partial contents is done by 
them. The accuracy of the partial contents is verified, too. So the two additional 
properties [9] that must be satisfied for any MS with distinguished signing authorities 
are  
I. Without revealing the entire message, partial contents can be easily verified. 
II. There should be distinguished signing authority for each member 
In this work, we present several of the most relevant                        with 
                                  which are based upon DLP.  
3.2 Review of Harn’s Scheme 
 
In 1999, L. Harn first proposed an MS                                        which 
is used in several                            [9]. As an example, a credit card 
company or a telephone company or a medical insurance company can set up a joint 
11 
 
                                                                               
                                                                                     
document. Then            is given                                   for his 
partial contents. The scheme in general consists of three phases: the system initiation 
phase,                                     and                   , and the 
                          and                   . 
 (i) System initialization phase 
Generally                          ,   and  , where   is some             
number,   is a primitive element in       and   being the one-way hash function are 
used. Let the signing group is {         }. Each signer randomly picks an integer    
from         as                                                 
        for 
          . Then the group public key           
 
    is calculated. 
 (ii)                                                       : 
Suppose there are n signers                           the distinguished 
messages           respectively.  
(a)                                :  
Every signer    randomly picks a number    from         and computes 
    
       , then broadcasts   to all signers. Also    broadcasts       to all 
signers. Once all the   ’s for            are available by means of the broadcast 
                    calculates the value      
 
        . Then    tries to find the 
solution for individual signature equation 
       
               
 
To obtain the value of    where  
                         and      can be 
received                            yielded by other signers                 
and j   i. Therefore the set (  ,   ) is considered as the                      for the 
               by the signer   . 
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(b)                                  : 
  Once the individual signature (  ,   ) is received by the clerk from each    , he 
verifies                                  checking verification equation  
  
      
           
 
It is considered that the individual signature (  ,   ) received from each    is verified if 
the above equation holds.  
                                                       :  
(a) Group signature generation:  
After receiving all the individual signatures the clerk verifies them and computes  
     
 
   
      
     
 
   
      
Where ( ,  ) is considered as the multisignature signed by all signers           on 
the message {          } 
(b)                             :  
The                    verified by 
  
 
           
Where  
     
 
   
      
and   
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Advantages 
a)      signer gets                                 because each of them is 
responsible for preparing a section of message. 
b) In place of signing                each signer needs to sign 
                      The computation of                is faster than that 
of          because of the                                             his own 
      and the other       has been computed by the other signer.  
c) There are certain situations where some of the verifiers are only allowed to access 
                                                                                    
be done                                             the whole message. This 
feature is achieved by providing                                 the inaccessible 
contents to the verifier. As an example, by disclosing   , and       to the verifier, 
                                   authenticity of  .  
Disadvantages 
a) Later Li et al.                          is vulnerable to their attack [23]. 
According to Li et al.                                      can be forged by a 
malicious                         any private                          . It is 
almost impossible to detect the insider attack for any outsider or verifier. The CA 
needs                   that                                       of his public 
key in order to prevent their attack. Therefore this attack points some weakness in 
Harn’s scheme by increasing load and causing                      and users. 
b) Additionally,                , it was not possible for an individual signer    
                                              although the fact             
            for his partial content is true. There is no evidence to distinguish the 
signing authorities. The cause being so obvious                     , all 
                      and multisignatures are generated on the same hash digest of 
the hash digests of all the partial contents. Hence, the use of the individual 
signatures as proof for the partial content is unacceptable.                     
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                                             is proposed in order to guard 
against Li et al.’s attack without the help of CA [11]. 
3.3 Review of Hwang’s Scheme 
 
In 2003 S. Hwang et. al. proposed                                distinguished 
                    which is secured                            without                
[11]. With the help of individual evidence provided by this new scheme puzzlement 
over authority due to malice can be avoided. The entire scheme consists of 3 phases. 
                                          
Let   and   are two publicly known large prime numbers such that q|p-1. The 
integer g is considered as                                in      , and the function 
    being a public one-way              . Let the               is {          }. 
Every member    randomly picks his private key         and calculates his public key 
    
       . Then the                   
 
       
  
 
   
      
is calculated. 
                                
Let the               {          } wants to obtain                       the 
message                . The member    is only in charge                 
content  , for           . 
Step1: Each member    picks a random integer         and computes     
        
and       for           .                    broadcasts    and 
      to the other     members and a predetermined clerk  . 
Step2: The commitment value   is calculated by each member    
15 
 
     
                
 
   
 
The clerk also calculates the                   . 
 
Step3: Each member     finds the solution    satisfying the following condition. 
                                 , with                         . 
 Then                                                   (  ,   ) to the clerk. 
Step4:                                                  (  ,   ) by means of the 
equation           
       
                    after receiving all of the 
individual signatures (  ,   )’s.                                                then 
the clerk generates the multisignature ( , ) by computing 
     
 
   
      
Finally, ( ,  ) is the multisignature for the message                . 
                                  
                  ( ,  ) is verified by                              
           .Why the equation                    can be used to verify the 
multisignature ( ,  ) is shown in the following: 
        
 
      
                                               
 
    
                            
 
                       
 
    
 
 
                 
The partial contents of the message              can be verified without 
disclosing the entire document. If the verifier is only allowed to read the partial content 
  , then he will receive                                             to 
verify  the multisignature ( ,  ) 
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This new scheme provides additional evidence which can be used by the members 
in order to prove their distinguished signing authority. This feature was not there in 
Harn’s scheme. Moreover in this                                (  ,   ) as well as the 
multisignature ( ,  ) can show the relationship between an entire document, its partial 
                              . So that each member can                   has 
signing                                                 he has signed previously. 
However Hieu showed that the computation and                     for 
generation of the multisignature                                       number of signers 
in the group [24]. As the no of signers increases in a group, the time taken for the 
generation of the multisignatures also increases significantly. 
3.4 Review of Hieu’s Scheme 
 
                                                                         signing 
authorities [24]. The underlying mathematical problems for the two signatures schemes 
include solving discrete logarithmic problem and finding roots modulo prime. Each of 
the two proposed schemes consists of three phases named key generation, multisignature 
                                                      .  
First Scheme  
Let the signing group {          } wants to produce a multisignature for the 
message                 . The responsibility of the member    is only for the 
partial content, say              . 
                         
                                            clerk, the following parameters are 
defined:  
Step 1:                                 prime  , a prime           correspondingly 
with               and a one-way                    as                
17 
 
Step 2:             :                          such  that          ,    is 
                                    the member   . 
Step 3:           : group members' public keys such that     
        is computed 
                                     (  is           of the cyclic group 
of order       ). Adding or                    requires adding or deleting 
the                  by the clerk.  
Step 4:                                       for all signers, 
 where 
       
  
 
   
      
 
                                    
                                                                             
                        the multisignature                   . 
Step1:                                           and computes     
      . 
Then each signer    sends   to the clerk. 
Step2:                                             value  
  
     
     
 
   
      
and computes the values           and                           . 
Then he sends       to each of the signers. 
Step 3:                                             as follows 
                          , then each signer    sends     to the clerk.  
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Step 4:                                                  (  ,   ) from   signers, he 
                                                         . The clerk checks the 
                            as follows  
 
      
     
       mod p 
 
                                                                                         
      by computing 
     
 
   
      
Finally,       is the multisignature for the message                 
 
                                      
                                                   , the parameters (     ) are 
made available to the verifier in an authenticated manner.  
                                                            group public key  .  
Step 1: Using the multisignature       to compute   
 
            
Step 2: Compare values    and S. If       , then the signature is valid. Otherwise the 
signature is false.  
The partial contents of the message              can be verified without 
disclosing the entire document                                         the partial 
content  then he will receive                                             
to verify the multisignature       
Second Scheme  
Let the signing group {          }                                     for 
the message                 . The member    is only responsible for the partial 
content,   for               
19 
 
The Key Generation Phase  
This scheme                                  structure           , 
where   is a large prime number             and   is such even integer that        
      bits.                        signers and a trusted clerk, the following 
parameters are defined: 
Step 1:                           a large prime  , a prime divisor   having the 
structure            correspondingly with         and a one-way hash 
function such as                . 
Step 2:            :group                            that          ,    is 
selected                         by the member   . 
Step 3:           : group members' public keys such that      
       is computed 
                                    . Adding or                    
requires adding or deleting the corresponding                   
Step 4:                                       for all signers: 
       
  
 
   
      
 
                                    
                                                                carry out 
an exchange of data during the multisignature generation process.  
Step 1:                            number         and computes      
       . 
Then each signer    sends   to the clerk. 
 
Step2:                                                    
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and computes the values           and                           . 
Then he sends       to each of the signers. 
 
Step 3:                                    share    as follows 
   
                         
Then each signer    sends     to the clerk.  
Step 4                                                   (  ,   ) from   signers, he 
needs to                                                 . The clerk checks the 
signature of the individual as follows   
    
     
       mod p. If all of the 
individual signatures are legal,                          the multisignature 
      by computing 
     
 
   
      
Finally,       is the multisignature for the message                 
 
                                      
                                                   , the parameters (p, q, Y) 
are made available to the verifier in an authenticated manner. Verification of the 
                                  the group public key Y 
Step 1: Using the multisignature       to compute   
 
            
Step 2: Compare values    and S. If       , then the signature is valid. Otherwise the 
signature is false.   
                                                can be verified without 
revealing the whole document. If the verifier is only allowed to read the partial content 
  then he will receive                                             to 
verify the multisignature      . 
Hieu and Hung’s schemes                                        confusion 
over                        [24]. Moreover, the new                 generation of 
21 
 
the                                                 .          to Hwang et al.'s 
scheme,                                                      computation and 
                                       of the multisignature flexible.  
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Chapter 4 
Structured Multisignature Scheme 
4.1 Introduction 
 
                                                                                     
the                                                                                 
as multisignatures with diﬀerent meanings. Consider a company as an example. 
Generally, a document is signed by the head of a section only after other members of 
the section have signed it. Some other examples are banks and command structures. 
                            has a little                            . Nevertheless 
there are other                                          , such as the legal 
responsibility of the signers. This could affect their ranking and can be determined by 
the signing order. As per the applications, diﬀerent signing orders may be required. An 
MS, in which the set of the signers as well as the signing order can be veriﬁed, is called 
an OMS [24]. 
                                                                        have 
signed the message, and the veriﬁer may need to check that the correct order has been 
followed. Two types of signing order may be considered: 1) serial signing, which 
allows the verifier to detect the signing order from the signature, 2) parallel signing, 
there is no way,  a verifier can detect the signing order from a signature [13] . In [13, 
25, 26, 27, 28], we can see several OMS but in this thesis, we focus on OMS having the 
discrete logarithm problem as base primitive, therefore we will review the schemes 
[13,28]. 
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4.2 Review of Burmester’s Scheme  
 
 
System Initialization  
 
                                          primes   and q are chosen such that 
        [13]. A primitive-root   is selected over the cyclic group       and      
denotes a one-way collision                                      . Supposed 
(               ) are the signature order. All                       integer as their 
private keys         at random, compute their public keys sequentially as follows: 
    
       ,            
        .The public key of the group 
(               ) is                
 
                                      
 
Signature parameter R generation phase:  
 
(1) The first signer    randomly chooses an integer         and computes  
    
        
If gcd(      )    then chooses new    again.  
(2) For                 gives      to     
   randomly chooses         and computes          
           
If gcd(      )    then    chooses    again until gcd(      ) =  
 
(3)       .  
Signature parameter S generation phase:  
                generate   together as follows. 
(1)    computes                       
(2) For                 gives      to     
   veriﬁes that  
             
                 and if so computes 
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 (3)       
 
Multisignature.       is the multisignature on M by (               ). 
 
Verifier     verifies the multisignature       by checking the congruence 
                   
Zhang showed that Burmester’s scheme is not safe. An attacker can forge certain 
messages by forging his own public key, signature parameter and signature, provided 
he is the signer else he can do the forgery by forge signature parameters [29]. Moreover 
zhang proposed four inside attack methods  to the Burmester’s structured signature 
scheme by which the attacker can replace {              }(        ])         the 
message                  . Later he proposed an improved scheme. 
 
4.3 Review of W. Luo’s Scheme 
 
This                                           the signers’ signature parameters in 
signature process, which can resist forgery attack [28]. When the signers finish 
generating their signature parameters, then they generate a parameter according to their 
                                                                                  
to check whether their signature parameters is valid. In this way, the improved scheme 
                                                                                          
 signature process and signature verification.  
 
                      
 
(1)The system chooses two large primes   and q such that        , let   be the 
primitive-root of the cyclic group      ,      denotes a one-way 
                    cryptographic hash function. are the signature order. 
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(2) The signers (               ) respectively choose            )        
randomly as their private keys, and                           sequentially as 
follow     
       ,         
        
(3)  Signers open system parameters and                  , meanwhile, preserve their 
private keys. 
Signature Process  
Signature Parameters R Generation  
The signature verifier    randomly chooses an integer         and computes his 
signature parameters     
       , then publish    to all the signers. For    
           ,    randomly selects their own integer         , and computes their 
signature parameters sequentially as follows:     
       ,         
       . 
Then broadcast to all of the users (signers and verifier). The last signer    computes the 
signature parameters     . 
 
When the signer    completes generating his signature parameters  , then he 
computes      
        and sends    to the system verifier    to verify whether his 
signature parameters is forgery. 
Signer’s Signature Parameters Verification  
                                                                              
parameters are forgery or not. If someone’s signature parameters is fake, then signature 
                                                                                   
message by forge his signature parameters. So, all signers’ signature parameters 
through verifying, this                   forgery attack. The method as follow: 
When system verifier    received the signer   ’s   , he verifies   
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If the one of two                         , it is means that the signer   ’s  signature 
parameters is forgery, so the signer verifier must suspend the next signer      to 
generate his signature parameters and let    generate his signature parameters again 
until the signer   ’s signature parameters                        signers’ signature 
parameters are valid, the process of signature parameters verification completed.  
 
Generation of signature  
 
The signer is    firstly computes the signature                        then 
sends        to the next signer. The signer                , takes the following 
steps:  
 
(1) Verifying               
           ,                           , it means 
that the structured multisignature is valid, or                      and judge the 
signature invalid. 
(2) Firstly he computes the signature                             , then 
sends        to the next signer. 
 
When all of the                                   message M, the last signer sends 
       to system verifier   . Firstly,   computes     , then verifies the equations that 
        
            establish or not.                           , it is means that 
                      , else judge the signature invalid, and terminate the signature. 
Lou et. al. points out a structured multisignature scheme against forgery attack and 
shows that the                       inside and outside forgery attack by verifying 
signature parameters [28]. 
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Chapter 5 
Multisignature Scheme for Specified 
Group of Verifiers 
  
5.1 Introduction 
 
Usually a single                      to sign a message and the validity of the signature 
can be checked by any number of verifier(s). Nevertheless, there are 
                                                                               
veriﬁer in                    of verifiers together will be able to verify the validity of 
the multisignatures [12]. Often there are situations in which a single verifier cannot be 
trusted with the signature process. For example a board needs to approve a confidential 
document. It would be more reliable to handle the responsibility on a group of board 
members rather than trusting a single member with verifying the document and the 
signature. 
5.2 Review of Laih and Yens’ scheme 
 
                     (LY) first proposed the concept of the multisignature 
                                                                           this 
                                                                                
                                                                                    
                                                                                  
of verifiers need a clerk to assist                         and verifying 
multisignatures, respectively. Like all other multisignature schemes LY scheme consists 
                                                                              
verification. 
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Key generation phase: 
Let                     be the group of   signers and 
                                                           , there is a 
speciﬁed user, called clerk. The clerk     of the signers’                      for 
verifying all partial signature signed by signer in    and                     
multisignature. The Clerk     of the verifiers’ group is                           all 
verifiers in    to verify the multisignature.  
                   plays here a crucial role in performing this multisignature 
scheme.                            2              ‘ ’ & ‘ ’ such that        . It 
also selects an element         with order ‘ ’. Each         selects his private key 
       and                     key       
        . Each         selects his 
private key        and                     key       
        .Then   , and    
respectively publish thir group public keys   
  and   
       
  
            
 
   
 
and               
                 
 
Multisignature generation phase:  
               Gs                                             multisignature of a 
message M for the speciﬁed group Gv of veriﬁers: 
1. Each         chooses a random integer   , computes        
  
  
      and and 
sends    to     . 
2.    computes            
 
    and broadcastes x to all signers in Gs . 
3. Each         computes          and                   , then sends    to 
    . 
4. Upon receiving all              ),     computes 
          
and                
 
   ,  
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and sends M and its multisignature (e, w) to Gv . 
 
                                :  
                GV                                       the multisignature of a 
message M : 
1. Each         computes  
      
     
  
 
 
   
      
and sends    to    . 
2.      computes  
           
 
   
 
and then broadcastes X to all verifiers GV. 
3. Each                                                          by checking if   
        . If the equality holds, the multisignature       of  is indeed signed by 
GS. 
                                                                       alone 
                                                                                    
to Xie, if the specified group of verifiers has ever verified the multisignature signed by 
the group of signers    and has new participant, they can cooperate to forge 
                                                                      members. 
It also states that if a specified group of verifiers has ever verified the multisignature 
                                                                             
secret key substitution due to the leaked secret key [32].   
Moreover later Yen himself showed the vulnerability of the LY scheme to a new 
attack,                                                        cheating signer(s), in a 
multi-verifier, signature scheme with verifier specification [33]. 
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5.3 Review of Hwang’s Scheme 
 
                                                                              
                                                                                      
                                                                               
                                                                                       
                                                                             The 
                               of verifiers also need a clerk, respectively. Brief 
review of the HCC scheme is described as follows. 
                    : 
Let                      be the                                   verifiers, the 
clerk of    and the clerk of    respectively. First of all, the trusted center also selects 
the same  ,  , and   as those in the LY scheme. All signers in    share a common 
secrete key       . Each                             key         and computes his 
       keys    
            and    
              . Then, GS publishes three group 
public keys   ,   
 ,   
    
Where 
         
      , 
  
      
 
 
   
      
  
       
  
 
   
      
All signers in GV share common secret key     . Each         selects his 
private key        and computes his public key    
            and    
   
            . Then Gv publishes three group public keys      
 ,   
   where 
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All signers in                                 to generate the multisignature of a 
message  for the speciﬁed group of verifiers:  
1. Each         choose a random integer   , computes  
        and    
            
and sends the pair to     . 
2.     checks if    
          
             for  all     . If the equality holds then 
    informs     and     of resending their new pairs; otherwise he broadcasts 
    
                
                  
              to all signers in   . 
3.  Each         computes  
       
            
 
   
 
      
        
                          
            
and                                
and sends    to    . 
4. Upon receiving all               ,     verifies the validity of    by checking if 
             
  
  
         for i= 1, 2, 3,….,n. If all partial signatures are valid 
then     computes             
 
   , and sends  and         to   . . 
                                   
All veriﬁers in    perform the following steps to recover the message from the 
multisignature and check the message: 
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1.     computes 
     
        ,     
        
         and then sends the results to all verifiers in  
    . 
2. Each         computes     
             and      
     
               and sends 
the results to     
3.     computes  
  
       
          
            
 
   
 
         
     
              
 
   
 
And obtains          
       
         . If the message M is meaningful then M 
is indeed sent and signed by GS . 
 
He, showed that the clerk of a speciﬁed group of veriﬁers can alone verify the validity 
of multisignatures without the help of other verifiers [31]. Therefor this scheme can’t be 
applied for the application of generation of multisignature scheme for           group 
             
5.4 Review of Xie and Yu’s Scheme 
 
                                                                        
                                                                          imp-
-rovement of Laih and Yen’s multisignature scheme can be divided into three phases: 
                                                                                  
verification phase [32].  
The system initialization phase  
The parameters are almost same as those used in Laih and Yen's scheme. Initially, 
a trusted center chooses a large prime  , a large prime divisor   such that       , an 
element   in    of  order  , and a one-way hash function     . These are then 
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published as the public parameters. Let                    be the signer group of   
signers and                    be the verifier group of   verifiers. In   and    
each of them has a special user. Called the‘clerk’. Each        chooses his secret key 
        and computes his public key      
        . In the same way, each 
       chooses his secret key         and then computes      
         as his 
public key.   ’s public key      
    
         and   ’s public key    
             are then published. 
                                : 
 
        All signers in    perform the                                 multisignature of 
message  for the specified group    of verifiers.  
(1) Each          selects a random element         and computes 
      
       ,     
        and sends        to     .    computes  
          
 
   
 
       
   
 
          
 
   
  
and broadcasts   and   to all signers in    . 
(2)    Each         computes 
                          
then sends    to     
(3) Upon receiving all                   verifies each      partial signature  
by checking  
  
              
                    
If all of the above equations hold, the multisignature can be obtained as       
where            
 
    and     sends it to    . 
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 All verifiers in    wish to verify the multisignature of message ‘ ’ and do the 
following steps: 
Step 1: Each         computes      
         and sends     to      
Step 2: Each     computes            
 
    and broadcasts X to all verifiers in    
Step 3: Each     veriﬁes the validity of the multisignature       for the message   by 
checking 
            
       
5.5 Review of Zhang and Xiao’s scheme 
 
                                                                                    
                                                                                   
signatures [35].                                             [31]. 
                                                                                
                                                                          
Key generation phase.  
Let                     be the group of n signers and                     
                                                                                 
each group there is a specific user called clerk. The clerk     of the signers’ group is 
responsible for verifying all partial signature signed by signer in    and combining 
them into multisignature. 
The Clerk     of the verifiers’ group is responsible for assisting all verifiers in    
to verify the multisignature. The trusted center plays here a crucial role in performing 
this multisignature scheme. 
The trusted center plays here a crucial role in performing this multisignature 
scheme. The trusted center     selects 2 layers of ‘p’ & ‘q’ such that        . It also 
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selects an element         with order ‘ ’. Each of         and         register 
themselves with the trusted center in order to become a part of the scheme.    
distributes private key         to each signer and private key        to each verifier. 
Each of the signer computes his public key       
        and similarly each verifier 
computers his public key       
        . The    and    respectively publish their 
group public key    ; where 
      
              
                    
            
Multisignature Generation Phase: 
(a) Each          selects a random element         and computes     
        
along with   
    
       . Then sends         to     . 
(b)     computes  
          
 
   
 
            
 
   
 
And then sends    to all signers in    . 
(c) Each     computes 
             
            
Then sends   to     . 
(d) Upon receiving all                   verifies each      partial signature by 
checking  
   
               
        
and computes  
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and sends on and its multisignature       to    . 
Multisignature Verification phase: 
 All verifiers in    wish to verify the multisignature of message ‘m’ and do the 
following steps: 
Step 1: Each         computes      
        and sends     to      
Step 2: Each     computes            
 
    
 and broadcasts X to all veriﬁers in Gv 
Step 3: Each     veriﬁes the validity of the multisignature by checking 
  
                
Later, it was identified that a dishonest clerk of signing group can change the 
signing message to an arbitrary one while he is cooperating with the signers to produce 
a multisignature [36]. The weakness is mainly caused by the linear relationship between 
     and   in     . Further, the vulnerability of Zhang-Xiao’s multisignature scheme 
for specified group of verifiers to forgery attack that an attacker can forge the 
multisignature for any message was demonstrated [37]. 
  
37 
 
 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
There are different kinds of multisignature schemes and each of them can be 
categorized into different categories depending on either the base primitives of the 
underlying schemes or the role of the signers played during the generation of the 
multisignature or the verification process of the signatures. We have studied a number 
of existing multisignature schemes based on DLP. It has been observed that many of 
the proposed schemes are insure. In general the strength of any signature scheme 
against forgery depends on the difficulty of finding signer’s private key, which in turn 
depends on the length of the key and underlying base primitive. There is no evidence 
of any feasible algorithm for efficiently solving DLP yet, but still many security 
attacks are possible by indirect means [38]. So the size of the key for underlying 
mathematical problem should be chosen such that the time and cost for forging a 
multisignature should exceed the value of the information.   
Additionally observations revel that some of discussed multisignature schemes 
involve great computational effort.  The requirement that all signers must be present 
simultaneously to carry out the signature procedure can cause a delay in obtaining a 
multisignature. In case of structured signature the signing order constraint may cause 
additional delay. Moreover the fact that OMS demands a particular signing order, 
users are forced to verify each signer’s signature following the inverse order. 
Sometimes given a group of signers and a multisignature for a given message, the 
multisignature protocol must be performed once again by all the members of the 
group each time one new signer joins the group. These reasons make clearly the 
necessity of a deep study in order to design new more efficient DLP-based 
multisignature schemes. 
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